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1. Introduction 
 
It almost goes without saying that acceptability judgments form a continuous 
spectrum. While many sentences are either clearly acceptable or clearly unaccept-
able, a significant number of sentences fall somewhere in between in a gray area 
of partial acceptability. This fact has been explicitly admitted by linguists since at 
least Chomsky 1965. The working assumption adopted by most linguists over the 
past 40 years has been that these intermediate levels of acceptability are caused 
by properties other than grammatical knowledge. Linguists have assumed that 
grammatical knowledge is categorical — sentences are either grammatical or 
ungrammatical — and that the continuous spectrum of acceptability is caused by 
extra-grammatical factors (plausibility, working memory limitations, etc.). Of 
course, ideas such as strength of violation have been introduced into theories of 
grammatical knowledge at various times, for instance Huang’s (1982) proposal 
that ECP violations are stronger than Subjacency violations or Chomsky’s (1986) 
proposal that each barrier crossed leads to lower acceptability. However, with 
the notable exception of Optimality Theory (see especially Keller 2000, 2003), 
these analyses have been the exception rather than the rule. 
 The past ten years or so have seen a major shift in attitudes toward 
intermediate levels of acceptability. With the increasing use of formal 
experimental methods for  measuring acceptability — a methodology that has 
come to be known as experimental syntax — it has become almost trivial to 
detect subtle differences along a continuous spectrum of acceptability. This new 
power afforded by experimental syntax raises the question of whether the 
continuity of acceptability reflects a continuity in grammatical knowledge that 
should be captured by the theory of grammar, or in other words, whether the 
working assumption of the past 40 years should be abandoned (see especially 
Keller 2000, Fanselow et al. 2004).  
 While the answer to this question is ultimately an empirical one that is far 
from being settled, this report presents two pieces of experimental evidence for a 
categorical distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences. The 
first is a direct prediction of theories that assume categorical grammaticality. The 
psychological claim underlying theories of categorical grammaticality is that 
ungrammatical sentences have no licit representation, or in other words, cannot 
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be constructed from the available mental computations. Grammatical sentences, 
on the other hand, have licit representations that can be constructed from the 
available mental computations. This predicts that extra-grammatical factors that 
affect the acceptability and are predicated on the existence of a representation, 
such as syntactic priming (Luka & Barsalou 2005), should not affect the accepta-
bility of ungrammatical sentences. Section 2 presents results from Sprouse (2007) 
that confirm this prediction: Ungrammatical sentences, in particular island 
violations (Ross 1967), do not show a structural priming effect. 
 The second piece of evidence comes from the experimental syntax 
technique magnitude estimation. Unlike traditional tasks such as the yes/no–task 
and the Likert scale task in which subjects must categorize their responses, 
magnitude estimation allows subjects to respond using the theoretically infinite 
continuum of values available on the positive number line (see Bard et al. 1996). 
By removing the categorization aspect of the task, one might expect that res-
ponses would no longer show any categorical distinction between grammatical 
and ungrammatical sentences. Contrary to this prediction, section 3 presents 
evidence from Sprouse (2007) that subjects impose a form of categorization on 
magnitude estimation responses, and that this categorization appears to 
correspond with the grammatical/ungrammatical distinction. 
 
 
2. Syntactic Priming and Categorical Grammaticality 
 
Syntactic priming is the facilitation of a structure through previous exposure to 
that structure. For instance, speakers tend to repeat structures that they have 
either heard or spoken recently (e.g., Bock 1986, Pickering & Branigan 1998), and 
readers tend to show faster reading times for structures that they have recently 
read (e.g., Noppeney & Price 2004, Kaschak & Glenberg 2004). Of particular 
interest to our present purposes is that Luka & Barsalou (2005) found that expo-
sure to structures in a reading task increase the acceptability of those structures 
in a subsequent rating task. This suggests that syntactic priming can be indexed 
by acceptability rating tasks, or to put it another way, that acceptability ratings 
are affected by repetition. 
 Syntactic priming is the effect of one sentence on a structurally identical 
subsequent sentence. This entails the possibility of constructing the structural re-
presentation in question. From the perspective of theories of categorical gramma-
ticality, only grammatical sentences have representations that can be constructed, 
therefore only grammatical sentences should show syntactic priming effects. 
While Luka & Barsalou (2005) demonstrate a syntactic priming effect for (by hy-
pothesis) grammatical structures, ungrammatical structures were precluded from 
the priming analysis because ungrammatical sentences could not be presented to 
the subjects during the reading phase. Presentation of ungrammatical sentences 
during the reading phase could have drawn attention to the dimension of 
acceptability, and potentially biased the subjects prior to the acceptability rating 
task. 
 The idea of syntactic priming of acceptability judgments is well known by 
syntacticians concerned with acceptability judgments. It has long been anec-
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dotally reported that judgments tend to get better over time, a phenomenon that 
Snyder (2000) calls syntactic satiation. In fact, Snyder presents evidence that naïve 
subjects show a satiation effect with two ungrammatical structures (wh-islands 
and Complex NP Constraint islands) in a yes/no–acceptability task. Prima facie, 
this appears to be evidence for a syntactic priming effect of ungrammatical 
sentences, contrary to the predictions of theories of categorical grammaticality. 
 Sprouse (2007) re-examines Snyder’s evidence for satiation in detail. In that 
paper, I argue that Snyder’s design introduces a confound that may be respon-
sible for his results: Subjects may adopt a strategy in which they attempt to 
equalize the number of yes– and no–responses, resulting in an increase in yes–
responses over the course of the experiment. While the evidence for this 
confound cannot be reviewed here (the reader is referred to Sprouse 2007 for 
details), the re-designed experiments that rectify this confound can. As will 
become apparent shortly, once the yes/no–strategy confound is eliminated, there 
is no evidence for syntactic priming of ungrammatical structures in acceptability 
judgment tasks, as predicted by theories of categorical grammaticality. 
 
2.1. Rationale and Design 
 
Theories of categorical grammaticality predict that ungrammatical sentences will 
not be affected by syntactic priming. To test this prediction, four experiments 
were conducted, one experiment for each of the following island violations:  
 
(1) Islands tested for syntactic priming (satiation) 
Subject island:  Who do you think the email from is on the computer? 
Adjunct island: Who did you leave the party because Mary kissed? 
Wh-island:   Who do you wonder whether Susan met? 
CNPC island:  Who did you hear the rumor that David likes? 
 
Over the course of the Subject and Adjunct island experiments, subjects were 
exposed to 14 instances of the island violation. Over the course of the wh- and 
CNPC island experiments, subjects were exposed to 10 instances of the island 
violation. 
 Two design features were incorporated in these experiments in order to 
eliminate the possibility of the yes/no–strategy. First, the task was magnitude 
estimation. The theoretically unlimited number of levels of acceptability made 
possible by magnitude estimation decreases the possibility of subjects counting 
the number of each type of response. Second, the number of grammatical and 
ungrammatical sentences were balanced in each experiment. Even if subjects 
attempt to track the number of responses (perhaps with respect to the modulus 
sentence; see section 3 below), the distribution is already balanced, so no change 
should result. Judgments were collected for each repetition of the island vio-
lation. A syntactic priming (satiation) effect would result in an upward trend in 
acceptability, which could be confirmed statistically through linear regression. 
All of the subjects were undergraduates at the University of Maryland with no 
formal training in linguistics. The sample sizes for the experiments were 20, 24, 
20, and 17, respectively.  
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2.2. Results 
 
Following the standard data analysis procedures in Bard et al. 1996 and Keller 
2000, responses were divided by the reference sentence and log transformed 
prior to analysis.1 The means for each exposure are given in the graphs below. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Subject islands 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Adjunct islands 
                                                
    1 See  Sprouse 2007 for evidence that the log transformation may be unnecessary. 
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Figure 3:  Wh-islands 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  CNPC islands 
 
 
 
 
 Repeated measures linear regressions (Lorch & Meyers 1990) confirm that 
there are no significant increases in acceptability for any of the islands tested. 
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 b Exp(b) p 
Subject island –0.13 0.003 .14 
Adjunct island –0.32 0.003 .52 
Wh-island 0.08 0.008 .14 
CNPC island 0.001 –0.006 .44 
 
Table 1:  Linear regression of means 
 
 
2.3. Discussion 
 
Categorical grammaticality predicts that some extra-grammatical effects on 
acceptability may be asymmetrical, affecting grammatical structures but not un-
grammatical structures. Syntactic priming is one such factor: The priming effect 
is predicated upon the existence of a licit representation. Given that ungramma-
tical structures have no licit representation, categorical grammaticality predicts 
that there should be no syntactic priming effect for ungrammatical structures. 
While Luka & Barsalou (2005) demonstrates syntactic priming effects on accept-
ability for grammatical structures, the results of these experiments suggest that 
there are no syntactic priming effects on acceptability for ungrammatical 
structures, as predicted by categorical grammaticality. These results also suggest 
that asymmetric extra-grammatical effects on acceptability may be a useful tool 
for identifying the grammatical status of structures that are neither clearly gram-
matical or clearly ungrammatical. 
 
 
3. Magnitude Estimation and Categorical Grammaticality 
 
In many ways, the magnitude estimation task has become synonymous with 
experimental syntax. The idea behind the task is simple, and perhaps easiest to 
explain with an example: Imagine that you are presented with a set of lines. The 
first line is the modulus or reference, and you are told that its length is 100 units. 
You can use this information to estimate the length of the other lines using your 
perception of visual length. For instance, if you believe that the line labeled item 
1 below is twice as long as the reference line, you could assign it a length of 200 
units. If you believe item 2 is only half as long as the reference line, you could 
assign it a length of 50 units. Figure 5 illustrates: 
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Figure 5:  Magnitude estimation task 
 
 
The resulting data are estimates of the length of the items in units equal to the 
length of the reference line.  
 Bard et al. (1996) were the first to argue that this technique could be 
adapted for the estimation of acceptability. For instance, imagine you are 
presented with a pair of sentences. The first is the reference sentence, and you are 
told that its acceptability is 100 units. The acceptability of the second sentence can 
then be estimated using the acceptability of the first as a reference: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Estimation of acceptability 
 
 
Bard et al. argue that this task is superior to the standard scale tasks usually used 
in acceptability studies because (i) it allows subjects to distinguish as many levels 
of acceptability as they want, unlike scale tasks in which they are not limited to 5 
or 7 choices, and( ii) the distance between levels of acceptability are measured in 
regular units (equal to the acceptability of the reference sentence), unlike scale 
tasks in which the distance between points is lost to categorization. 
 The two benefits of magnitude estimation suggested by Bard et al. have in 
many ways become a catalyst for considering continuous models of grammatical 
knowledge. The freedom to distinguish a theoretically infinite number of levels 
of acceptability and the ability to quantify the distance between those levels with 
a standard unit are exactly what is needed to precisely model continuous 
acceptability. However, it is the underlying assumption of linearity that truly 
enables a continuous model of grammaticality: The magnitude estimation task 
makes no explicit distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical 
Reference:  What do you wonder whether Mary bought? 
Acceptability: 100  
Item:   What did Lisa meet the man that bought? 
Acceptability: —— 
Reference:  ———— 
Length:  100  
Item 1:  ———————— 
Length:  200  
Item 2:  —— 
Length:  50  
Item 3:  ———————————— 
Length:  300 
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structures. They are both measured using the same reference (measured in the 
same units), as if they form a linear system. Sprouse (2007) investigated the 
linearity assumption of magnitude estimation data in detail. As will become 
evident below, one of the results of that study suggests that subjects introducing 
a categorical distinction in magnitude estimation data that appears to mirror the 
theoretical distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences. 
 
3.1. Rationale and Design 
 
Two magnitude estimation experiments were conducted, each identical in 
content and design, except for the reference sentence. The reference sentence for 
the first experiment was a type of wh-island violation, specifically an if-island: 
What do you wonder if Larry bought?. The reference for the second experiment was 
a Coordinate Structure Constraint violation: What do you think Larry bought a shirt 
and?. The critical manipulation is that the reference sentence for experiment 2, the 
Coordinate Structure Constraint (CSC) violation, is one of the conditions in the 
experiment. Therefore the values obtained from the first experiment can be used 
to predict the values in the second experiment. We know that the value of the 
CSC in the second experiment is going to be 1 (because it is the reference unit). So 
for instance, if the CSC is rated as .5 in the first experiment, we would expect all 
of the values in the second experiment to be doubled (because .5 x 2 is 1). If the 
CSC is rated as .25 in the first experiment, then we would expect all of the values 
in the second experiment to be quadrupled (because .25 x 4 is 1). In other words, 
the distribution of the results will remain constant, but the absolute values of the 
results will be transformed by the value necessary to translate the CSC into a 
single unit. 
 The body of the experiments were identical. Each contained 8 different 
violations types: 
 
(2)  Violations judged in magnitude estimation experiments 
 a. Adjunct Island 
  What does Jeff do the housework because Cindy injured? 
 b. Coordinate Structure Constraint  
  What did Sarah claim she wrote the article and? 
 c. Infinitival Sentential Subject Island 
  What will to admit in public be easier someday? 
 d. Left Branch Condition 
  How much did Mary saw that you earned money? 
 e. Relative Clause Island 
  What did Sarah meet the mechanic who fixed quickly? 
 f. Sentential Subject Island 
  What does that you bought anger the other students? 
 g. Complex NP Constraint 
  What did you doubt the claim that Jesse invented? 
 h. Whether-Island 
  What do you wonder whether Sharon spilled by accident? 
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Subjects judged five of each violation type. All subjects were University of 
Maryland undergraduates with no formal training in linguistics. 22 subjects 
participated in the first experiment (If-reference), 31 participated in the second 
(CSC-reference). 
 
3.2. Results 
 
Following the standard data analysis procedures in Bard et al. 1996 and Keller 
2000, responses were divided by the reference sentence and log transformed 
prior to analysis. The mean judgments for each violation type for both experi-
ments are provided in the following graph: 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Mean ratings for If and CSC references 
 
 
 
 The first thing to notice is that the shape of the two lines is nearly identical. 
This suggests that the relative judgments remain constant across the two 
experiments. This can be quickly confirmed by comparing pairs of conditions in 
the two experiments. As the table below indicates, three pairs of conditions that 
are statistically different in the first experiment are also statistically different in 
the second experiment: 
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 If-reference CSC-reference 
Contrast t p t p 
ADJ-INF 3.86 .001 4.50 .001 
CNPC-SS 3.58 .001 3.10 .002 
Wh-RC 4.88 .001 1.70 .05 
 
Table 2:  t-Tests for if and CSC references 
 
 
Therefore we can be confident that the two experiments have a similar level of 
sensitivity to acceptability. 
 Despite the high degree of agreement with respect to relative judgments, 
there is an anomaly with respect to the overall distribution of the judgments. 
Notice that the CSC violation is approximately in the middle of the distribution 
of judgments in the first (if-reference) experiment: The CNPC and wh-conditions 
are more acceptable than the CSC, the INF condition is less acceptable, and the 
rest are statistically equal. We would expect a similar distribution of acceptability 
in experiment 2, with the only difference being that the CSC should be equal to 0. 
However, what we find is that there are no conditions judged more acceptable 
than the CSC (none are above 0). Furthermore, only two are statistically equal to 
the CSC, the CNPC and wh-conditions, which were the two that were more 
acceptable than the CSC in experiment 1. The rest of the conditions are all less 
acceptable than the CSC. This is expected for the INF condition, but the rest of the 
conditions were statistically equal to the CSC in experiment 1 
 These results suggest that subjects are not actually performing the magni-
tude estimation task, but rather performing a relative rating task in which the 
reference sentence serves as an upper bound for ungrammatical items. This is 
also true of the results from experiment 1. In fact, in both experiments, the only 
conditions that are rated above the reference item are the grammatical fillers. 
This suggests that subjects are imposing their own categorization on an other-
wise continuous task. 
 
3.3. Discussion 
 
By design, the magnitude estimation task provides subjects with a theoretically 
continuous (and infinite) response scale. As such, it is no more surprising that 
magnitude estimation tasks yield continuous measures of acceptability than it is 
that yes/no–tasks yield categorical measures of acceptability. Yet despite the 
continuous nature of the magnitude estimation  response scale, and despite the 
absence of any mention of a categorical grammaticality distinction in the 
magnitude estimation instructions, the subjects in these experiments appear to be 
imposing a categorical distinction on their acceptability judgments. While the 
spontaneous imposition of a categorical distinction on a continuous rating scale is 
surprising, it is entirely consistent with a categorical approach to grammaticality. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The tools of experimental syntax have made it possible to quantify continuous 
acceptability with relative ease. The question this raises is whether the tools of 
experimental syntax have also made it possible to investigate the predictions of 
theories of categorical grammaticality. 
 This report has presented two case studies that provide support for cate-
gorical grammaticality. The first study investigated one possible prediction of 
categorical grammaticality: The acceptability of grammatical and ungrammatical 
sentences should be affected by different factors. As predicted, the study found 
no syntactic priming effect for ungrammatical structures, despite evidence in the 
literature for syntactic priming of grammatical sentences (e.g., Luka & Barsalou 
2005). The second study investigated the nature of acceptability data itself, 
presenting evidence that subjects will impose categorical distinctions on continu-
ous rating scales. 
 While these studies can only begin to address the question of the nature of 
grammatical knowledge, they raise the possibility of finding more evidence for 
categorical grammaticality in the data being collected by experimental syntax. 
These results argue for a closer investigation of the tasks of experimental syntax, 
as well as a reconsideration of the psychological consequences of categorical 
grammaticality in studies of the factors affecting acceptability.  
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